Introduction
Inalienable possessions may be initially understood as those nouns which are morphosyntactically marked when non-possessed (Bally 1926; Chappell & McGregor 1996 , and references therein). In Q' eqchi'-Maya, this cross-linguistic grammatical category is instantiated as follows: members of a small subset of nouns take the suffix -(b')ej when non-possessed. The following examples demonstrate the morphological patterns evinced by alienable nouns and inalienable nouns under possession: In addition to many body parts and most kinship terms, this category includes words like name, shadow, and clothing. Its semantic extension includes not only parts of personable wholes, but also personable nodes in a social network. See Figure 1 . In this essay, the grammatical category of inalienable possession, and the notional domain so delimited, is motivated in terms of pragmatic functions and discourse patterns. In particular, it is argued that there are two key criteria underlying inalienable possession: first, whatever any person may be strongly presupposed to possess (identifiability); second, whatever such personal possessions are referred to frequently (relevance). See Figure 2 .
one says él se lava las manos (literally, 'he washes himself the hands'). 5 Such languages exhibit object-promotion: when the direct object is an inalienable possession, its possessor is encoded as a dative or accusative reflexive construction. In such languages, the semantic extension is usually confined to body parts, but may also include clothing and kinship terms. For example, in German one may say ich zerriß meine Hose (literally, 'I tore my pants'), or ich zerriß mir die Hose (literally, 'I tore to myself the pants), but the latter is only appropriate when the speaker was wearing the pants at the time of their tearing (Heine 1997) . And, in the case of the verb wegnehmen (to take away), such possessor-promotion may even occur with kinship terms. In other words, there is a relatively covert category of nouns in these languages, whose grammatical marking (object promotion) and semantic extension (body parts, kinship relations, and clothing) are formally and functionally comparable -but not identical -to inalienable possession in Q' eqchi' . Several scholars have mentioned frequency of possession as a key factor motivating inalienability (Nichols 1988 :579, Haspelmath 2006 , Kockelman 2007 . And many linguists take discourse frequency to be the key factor motivating grammatical categories more generally (Du Bois 1987 , Hawkins 2004 , so that the claim that it motivates inalienable possession (as one particular kind of grammatical category) should not be surprising. Nichols (1992) , for example, has made the important claim that inalienable possession is not primarily a semantic distinction, but rather a grammaticalization of the fact that inalienable possessions usually appear possessed in discourse. Haspelmath (2006) has argued against Haiman's claim (1983) that inalienable posession should be motivated in terms of iconicity. Instead, he argues that "frequency of occurrence in possessed constructions" (1) determines it. And his overarching proposal is that conceptualization leads to frequency, and frequency leads to form (11). To make this argument, he marshals morphosyntactic data from a wide-range of languages showing the variety of ways languages encode inalienability. However, his frequency data comes entirely from English: so he is using frequency data from English to make arguments about grammatical categories in other languages. In this way, there is still a discrepancy between the claims made and the evidence put forth to support them.
Using text-based data from Q' eqchi'-Maya, Kockelman examines non-derived NPs that appear possessed on initial mention (and have human possessors). He shows that this discursive category has substantial overlap with the grammatical category of inalienable possessions (marked by the suffix -b' ej). And he hypothesizes that "the grammatical category is ultimately the result of the discourse category; and the discursive category is ultimately the result of both relatively widespread cognitive processes [e.g. "what parts constitute a person as a cognitive frame"] and relatively localized cultural practices " (2007:351) . In that article, Kockleman was primarily focused on cultural practices surrounding the referents of inalienable possessions, and only sketched out the grammatical category and discourse pattern. In this essay, these categories and patterns are analyzed in full detail.
More generally, as will be argued in what follows, the issue is not just discourse frequency in some raw sense. For example, while making no claims about the nature of inalienability per se, DuBois (1980) found evidence in English narratives for a particular discourse pattern involving any part-whole relation -be it a woman and her arm, a tree and its branch, or a bike and its wheel. In particular, looking at the use of definite and indefinite articles (that is, the difference between the boy and a boy in English), he noticed that once a person has been introduced in a narrative, that person's body parts and clothing may be immediately referred to without first having to introduce them using an indefinite article. That is, body parts, hair, and clothing form part of a frame, whose discursive reactance is the fact that its members are able to be formally marked as definite on initial mention. Thus, "there was a woman who had a leg/mother" sounds odd, but "there was a woman whose leg/mother was broken/dead" sounds fine. 6 We might say, then, that the speaker assumes that the addressee assumes that entities belonging to the category of 'person' usually come with bodies, hair, and clothing. And we may argue that this discursive pattern includes not only body parts, hair and clothing, but also kinship relations, homes, and names. Indeed, it should -as a relatively graduated phenomenon -include whatever a particular speech community discursively assumes to necessarily belong to any referent that falls into the local category of person. More generally, as long as one understands the formal expression of this category to turn on discourse patterning (rather than grammatical encoding), and as long as one takes into account the various formal means by which the identifiability of referents may be marked (extending well beyond the range of definite and indefinite articles), such a frame is almost certainly a widespread phenomenon (Kockelman 2007) . Relative ease of identifiability and frequency of possession, then, should be two key criteria organizing the discursive patterning of inalienability and hence, ultimately, the grammatical category.
Grammatical Relations and Nominal Arguments
Q' eqchi' is a Mayan language of the Kichean family, spoken by some 500,000 people in Guatemala and Belize. Typologically, Q' eqchi' is morphologically ergative and head-marking: obligatory affixes on transitive verbs cross-reference the verb's A-role and O-role arguments; obligatory affixes on intransitive verbs cross-reference the verb's S-role arguments; and the same set of affixes that marks O-role In addition to transitive and intransitive verbal predicates, there is also a large class of stative predicates. These are similar to intransitive verbal predicates in that they only have one set of obligatory affixes, cross-referencing the verb's single Srole argument. But they are different in that the affixes are suffixed rather than prefixed; and in that they have a highly reduced paradigm for MATEs, which is also suffixed rather than prefixed. In this way, stative predicates have the following affixal order: Verb-MATE-Absolutive. Members of this class include positionals (chunchuu 'to be seated'), the existential and locative predicate (wank 'to be located, to exist, to have'), the progressive auxiliary verb (yoo 'to be doing'), and adjectives (when used as predicates). For example, line 4d of Text 1 shows such a stative predicate: chan-Ø-Ø (say-Pres-A(3s)) 'he says' .
I will refer to the obligatory arguments of such predicates (intransitive, transitive, stative), as cross-referenced by these affixes, as core arguments. Text 1 shows examples of all these verbal constructions: transitive constructions (3b-d, 4e, 5a-b); intransitive constructions (3a, 3e, 4a-b, 4d); and stative constructions (4d, 5c). Full NPs and independent pronouns may optionally occur in the clause, thereby instantiating such arguments as cross-referenced by such affixes. The relation between cross-referencing affixes and instantiated arguments is shown by subscripts.
In addition to arguments licensed by verbs, there are also arguments licensed by nouns. In particular, the set of affixes marking ergative case (A-role arguments) is also used, in slightly modified form, to mark the possessors of possessed noun phrases (PNPs). 7 As with verbs, an explicit NP encoding the possessor, as crossreferenced by such an affix, may optionally occur; and it too may be a possessed NP, and so on. Such possessed NPs have the following affixal order: Ergative-Noun. Text 1 shows examples of such possessed-noun constructions (3a-d, 4a-e, 5a-c). Again, the relation between cross-referencing affixes and instantiated arguments is shown by subscripts.
In contrast to core arguments, which are part of the semantic representation of a predicate, most additional arguments in a clause may be understood as non-core, or peripheral, arguments. Aside from adverbial NPs, most of these are licensed by adpositions, and come in three types. First, there are those headed by prepositions. For example: sa' k'iche' (Prep forest) 'in the woods'; and chi yuk (Prep goat) 'as a goat. ' Second, there are those headed by relational nouns. For example: x-b' aan li winq (E(3s)-RN Dm man) 'because of the man'; and r-e li ixq (E(3s)-RN Dm woman) 'to the woman' . And third, there are those headed by relational nouns which are themselves headed by prepositions. For example: sa' xyanq li tzuul (Prep E(3s)-RN Dm mountain) 'between the mountains'; and chi r-e li palaw (Prep E(3s)-RN Dm sea) 'by the edge of the sea' . Text 1 shows examples of these constructions (along with NPs they license, as marked by subscripts): bare prepositions (3e, 4a, 4d-e, 5c); bare relational nouns (3a, 4a-b, 5c); and prepositions plus relational nouns (3d, 4c).
Relational nouns are non-referential NPs, which are obligatorily possessed (as marked by an ergative cross-referencing prefix), and whose possessors are the arguments in question (as optionally instantiated by a pronoun or full NP). As will be discussed in detail in Section 7, there are around ten such relational nouns, and they often play a dual role as an unmarked, or referential NP (often an inalienable possession, as will be discussed below). Prepositions are distinct from relational nouns in that they do not consist of an obligatorily possessed head (as marked by a cross-referencing affix). In this way, while they functionally license an NP, they do not formally cross-reference the NP by an affix. For this reason, the NP in question must usually be instantiated. 8 There are really only two frequently used prepositions, and one of them (sa' 'at/in'), also plays a role as a relational noun (x-sa' (E(3s)-RN) 'inside of ') and an unmarked NP, itself an inalienable possession (sa'b' ej 'stomach'). In short, two well-know grammaticalization pathways are at work: one, whereby referential nouns (such as body part terms) grammaticalize into relational nouns; and another, whereby relational nouns grammaticalize into prepositions.
Within the class of relational nouns there is a sub-class of obliques: those whose arguments are (presumably) part of the semantic representation of a predicate, but which are not affixed on the predicates as such. Rather, they show up as the arguments of relational nouns which accompany such predicates. These include the demoted actors of passive constructions (marked with the relational noun -b' aan), the demoted undergoers of antipassive constructions (marked with the relational noun -e), and the recipient in various three-place predicates, such as 'to say to him' or 'to give to her' (marked by the relational noun -e). There is a general tendency: constructions encoding oblique arguments are composed of a relational noun without a preposition (the second class, above); whereas constructions encoding non-core arguments are composed of a relational noun with a preposition (the third class, above), or a bare preposition (the first class, above).
Finally, there are also 'extra NPs' -or those NPs occurring in a clause which are neither cross-referenced by an affix (be it on a verb, or a noun), nor formally licensed by a preposition. Some of these are just non-referential NPs: vocatives, predicate NPs, incorporated NPs, and so forth. And some of these are just adverbial NPs, often locative deictics, which encode the goal of an action or the locale of a state. Text 1 shows examples of such extra NPs: non-referential (3c, 4b-c); and adverbial (3c, 4a).
In sum, there are a variety of grammatical relations which involve nominal arguments. Overt NPs may thereby be formally licensed (as cross-referenced by an absolutive or ergative affix) as the arguments of intransitive, transitive, and stative predicates; as well as the possessors of NPs and relational nouns. NPs may be formally licensed by prepositions. And unlicensed NPs may occur in adverbial and/or non-referential contexts. Table 1 summarizes these relations. After discussing the different form classes of NPs that exist, we will examine how tokens of such form classes are distributed across these grammatical relations.
Form Classes and Possessed NPs
In Q' eqchi' , seven classes of (non-derived) nouns may be distinguished as a function of the morphological changes their members undergo when grammatically possessed (compare Stewart 1980; and see Lehman 1998, Nichols and Balthasar . These morphological changes, while highly frequent tendencies, do have some exceptions which I will point out. Moreover, given the relative infrequency of tokens for some of these classes, it is not always easy to determine whether the exceptions are idiosyncratic, perhaps due to performance issues or even dialectal and idiolectal variations. These classes have been ordered as a function of the degree to which they are morphologically marked when non-possessed. As may be seen in Table 2 , members of the first class are (almost) never possessed. This class includes relatively abstract words like na'bejil 'motherhood' , and words with unique referents such as saq' e 'sun' and po 'moon' -though the latter can be possessed by a woman to talk about her menstrual cycle. 9 Members of the second class of nouns take the suffix -Vl when possessed (where V is a vowel). 10 For example, tz 'uum 'skin' and in-tz'uumal 'my skin'; or baq 'bone' and in-baqel 'my bone(s) ' . I have only found four terms in this class: tz 'uum-al 'skin' , baq-el 'bone' , ich'm-ul 'vein/artery' , and kik'-el 'blood' . Another term metz' ew sits on the edge of this class: unpossessed, it may mean either 'strength' or 'muscle' . And this polysemy is differentiated when possessed, as it may occur either with a suffix (in-metz' ew-il 'my muscles') or without (in-metz' ew 'my strength'). Notice that this class has, in some sense, an opposite morphological pattern than Members of the third class undergo no changes when possessed by humans, but they take the suffix -Vl when possessed by nonhumans. For example, chakach 'basket' and x-chakach li winq (E(3s)-basket Dm man) 'the man's basket' , and xchakach-il li wa (E(3s)-basket-Abs Dm tortilla) 'the tortilla's basket' . Semantically, members of this class are difficult to characterize, but they include words such as chakach 'basket' , wa 'tortilla' , xul 'animal' , and be 'road' . Notice that when the possessor is nonhuman, the semantic relationship is not one of physical or legal possession per se, but rather part-to-whole, shared-locale, or means-to-end. That is to say, the basket does not belong to the tortillas; the basket is where the tortillas are kept. Similarly, we can speak of the 'town's road' or the 'tree's animal' . For this reason, members of this class may be semantically characterized as metonymic possessions. (Many possessions are, of course, metonymic rather than physical or legal; what is special about this class is that it is morphologically sensitive to the distinction.)
The fourth class of nouns is the largest and least marked. Aside from being prefixed by a possessive pronoun, its members undergo no changes when possessed. For example, tz'i' 'dog' and in-tz'i' 'my dog'; or maal 'axe' and in-maal 'my axe' . Given the ontological range over which members of this class may vary, there seems to be no underlying semantic domain to which it corresponds. This, then, is the unmarked class of nouns -the largest in size, and the least specified in meaning.
The fifth class has only one member, which is highly frequent, and involves suppletion: ochoch (almost always possessed) may be glossed as 'home'; and kab'l (almost always non-possessed) may be glossed as 'house. ' 11 In addition to humans, many animals may be said to have houses. This is especially true of domestic animals, or companion species, such as cats, dogs, pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks and cows.
Members of the sixth class of nouns lose the suffix -(b')ej when possessed. For example, ko'bej 'daughter (of woman)' and in-ko' 'my daughter'; or ch' oolej 'heart' and in-ch' ool 'my heart' . These words are pragmatically odd when not possessed, insofar as they have generic reference. That is, if you use these words in their nonpossessed form, they rarely refer to specific hands or daughters -but rather to hands or daughters in general. Think, for example, of sentences like 'arms are for hugging' . Because these nouns usually appear in possessed form, and because they are morphologically marked and pragmatically odd when non-possessed, they have been referred to as inalienable possessions. As will be discussed in the next section, this class includes most kin terms, many frequently used body-part terms, and the words for name, place, family, and clothing.
Members of the seventh class are (almost) always possessed. This class includes the majority of body part terms such as x-ch'ub '(his/her) navel' and x-maqab '(his/ her) chest' -unless they are involved in butchery. 12 Like class 1, this class is difficult to specify, in that it turns on the word 'always' which would be difficult to confirm. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider it as a limit class. Some linguists, such as Lehmann (1998) , would consider this class inalienable possessions as well: those words which are always possessed. And the technical term for distinguishing this class from the preceding class is inabsolutive inalienable (class 6) versus absolutive inalienable (class 7).
There are a number of derived NPs, usually nominalizations of other formclasses, that interact with possession. Gerunds, as a form-class in Q' eqchi' , consist of nominalizations of transitive predicates: ilok 'to see' becomes r-il-b' al (E(3s)-see-Nom) 'its seeing, or seeing it'; and kamsink 'to kill' becomes x-kamsink-il (E(3s)-kill-Nom) 'its killing or killing it' . In such constructions, the possessor of the gerund would be the usual object (or undergoer) of the predicate; and there is no MATE. Such constructions often occur with the stative predicate yook to mark progressive aspect. And they often occur in interclausal relations. 13 They are almost always possessed, and hence should belong to class 7.
Non-finite predicates, which have neither cross-referencing affixes nor MATEs, are quasi-NPs. They have a complementary distribution with gerunds (in progressive aspect constructions, and interclausal relations more generally), encoding erstwhile intransitive rather than transitive constructions. These are almost never possessed, and hence should belong in class 1. See Text 1, line 3e: kemok 'to weave' .
Many relatively concrete nouns and adjectives may be derived into relatively abstract nouns, using the suffix -Vl (where V is a vowel), sometimes iteratively: kaq 'red' becomes x-kaq-il (E(3s)-red-Abs) 'its redness'; and winq 'man' becomes x-winq-il-al (E(3s)-man-Abs-Abs) 'his manliness' . Such derived nouns are usually possessed. As such, this derivational process marks relatively abstract entities (redness, manhood), such that properties of a substance are construed as possessions of a possessor. This abstraction makes sense in the case of the second and third form-classes discussed above: in the case of extended bodily substances, such possessions are construed as unbounded (my blood, my bones, my nerves); and in the case of metonymic possessions, it is only the non-physical and/or non-legal sense which requires the suffixing. It is worthwhile noting that the one-dimensional continuum along which these form-classes have been ordered, might really be organized relative to two dimensions: one turning on whether an NP is more or less marked when possessed; and the other turning on whether an NP is more or less bounded/concrete or unbounded/abstract.
Finally, many intransitive predicates may be derived, via the suffix -ik, into a (usually) possessed noun referring to the time at which an event took place: kamk 'to die' becomes x-kam-ik 'its time of death, its event of dying, its death' . Many transitive verbs may be derived into an (usually) possessed noun, via the suffix -om, referring to the object of the action: ajok 'to desire, to love' becomes r-aj-om 'his loved one, her object of desire' . Many verbs may be derived into a (usually) possessed noun, via the suffix -leb', referring to the instrument with which an action is undertaken: kemok 'to weave' becomes x-kem-leb' 'its weaving instrument, or its loom' . And many verbs may be derived into a (usually) possessed noun, via the suffix -b' aal (which sometimes co-occurs with -leb'), referring to the place an action occurs (or the location of an instrument used to undertake the action):
While the focus in what follows will be inalienable possessions of the strict sort (those which take the suffix -b' ej when non-possessed), several of the classes just discussed are quasi inalienable possessions in that they overlap semantically or pragmatically with the main class. For example, extended bodily substances (class 2), suppletive possession (class 5), always possessed NPs (class 7), and many possessed NPs which have been derived may be understood as difficult to alienate parts of human possessors. As will be seen, however, they often differ in their overall frequency (there are many many more inalienable possessions, be it of any individual IP or of the class of IPs); they are more likely to be found in non-possessed form; and their possessors may or may not always be human. Table 3 lists all the inalienable possessions in Q' eqchi' . 14 As may be seen, there are five different subclasses. First, listed under (1) as Body Parts (Adpositions) are those inalienable possessions that have a grammatical role as not only a noun denoting a body part but also a relational noun or preposition denoting a spatial, temporal, or grammatical relation. There are around five such terms. Ix-(b)ej 'back' is also used in the adposition chi rix 'in back of, after' . It is also used to refer to the shells and fur of animals, as well as the bark of trees. U-hej 'face' is also used in the adposition chi ru 'in front of, before' . E-hej 'mouth' is also used in the adposition chi re 'at the edge of, during' , as well as marking dative case. Sa'-ej 'stomach' is also used in the adposition chi x-sa' 'inside of ' and, even more frequently, as the preposition sa' 'at/in' . And yii-b' ej 'waist' is also used in the adposition sa' xyii 'in the center of ' . In short, words for certain body parts provide a handy domain for the grammatical encoding of spatial and temporal relations. As will be discussed in Section 7, just about 
The Semantic Extension of Inalienable Possession
any IP can be used like a relational noun in the right context, and so this distinction between class 1 and class 2 should be understood as relative, not absolute. Second, listed under (2) as Body Parts (Appendages) are those inalienable possessions that refer to relatively discrete body parts. There are six such terms: uq'-ej 'hand' , oq-ej 'foot' , jolom-ej 'head, hair' , tz' ejwal-ej 'body' (or more vulgarly, 'penis'), xolol-ej 'throat/neck' , and ch' ool-ej 'heart' . Notice that these terms pick out the whole person (body), the five pieces farthest from the center (limbs, head and neck), and the innermost part of the person (heart). As discussed in Kockelman (2007) , the heart enters into a large number of frequently used grammatical constructions that denote intentional states such as memory, jealousy, estrangement, desire, worry, and belief. Thus, constructions involving this inalienable possession provide a handy domain for the metaphorical elaboration of mind.
Third, listed under (3) as Non-Body Parts are those four inalienable possessions that denote neither body parts nor kinship relations. The term aq'-ej 'clothing' may refer both to any particular article of clothing and to the general class of clothing, including both the locally made traje worn by women and the secondhand American clothing worn by men. The term na' aj-ej 'place' has three standard referents: the space of an individual's body or a group's bodies; the homestead (including house, garden, latrine, chicken coop, pigpen, and surrounding grounds); and the cornfield (usually limited to one's current milpa, but at times extended to include the extent of one's agricultural property). The term k' ab' a'-ej 'name' refers not only to first and family names, but also to basic-level terms such as 'dog' , 'tree' , and 'house' -that is, the names of things. Last, the term komun-ej 'family' is a loanword, coming from Spanish comunidad 'community' , which is now grammatically assimilated to Q' eqchi' . It usually refers to consanguineal kin (as a class), but it may be extended to include affinal and ritual kin, as well as all village members.
Listed under (4) as Marginal Members are peripheral inalienable possessions. Included are the words ketomj 'domestic animals' , awimj 'seedlings' , anumej 'evil spirit' (cf. Spanish anima 'soul'), tib' elej 'body' , muh(el)ej 'shadow, soul' , and musiq' ej 'breath, soul' . The first two of these words are phonetically odd (the combination /mj/ is rare), so that it looks like these used to be inalienable possessions but are not any longer, yet still bear a morphophonemic trace; and the last three are inalienable possessions for only some speakers (or perhaps in some dialects). There are also a few terms that end with /(b')ej/, but which do not seem to be inalienable possessions: sa'bej 'stomach ache' (cf. sa' ej); ojb' ej 'phlegm, cough, chill'; jolomb' ej 'head ache' (cf. jolomej); tuulej 'witchery' , and we' ej 'hunger' . The noun awab' ej 'leader' also has the correct morphology, and certainly shares a family resemblance with other inalienable possessions; however, it often occurs in non-possessed form and does not lose the suffix when it occurs in possessed form. In the text to be considered, two of these marginal members -mu(hej) 'shadow' and musiq' ej 'breath' -were not included in token counts of inalienable possessions, but are included in the discussion of their distribution. In short, just as certain inalienable possessions are coming into Q' eqchi' , others are falling out of Q' eqchi' . This is in no way, then, a fixed or stable category.
Lastly, listed under (5) as Kinship Terms are those inalienable possessions that make reference to particular social relations. Such terms are unique insofar as their referents are simultaneously inalienable possessions and inalienable possessors. They are ordered, from top to bottom, according to the following semantic feature hierarchy: consanguineal before affinal, lineal before collateral, ascending before descending, first-generation before second-generation, elder before younger, and male before female (cf. Greenberg 1980) . 15
Texts Considered and Coding Conventions
The preceding discussion has focused on the grammatical category of inalienable possession in Q' eqchi' as it was spoken during my fieldwork (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . In this way, it focused on present-day grammatical categories. Such analysis should be related to discourse patterns which involve inalienable possessions. Moreover, with the understanding that today's grammatical categories are often yesterday's discourse patterns, it is worth studying examples of narrative from previous eras. As Hawkins puts it: "Grammars are 'frozen' or 'fixed' performance preferences" (2004) . Insofar as Q' eqchi' was an unwritten language, this is of course impossible. However, one particularly good text, transcribed from an oral recounting around 1900, provides an opportunity. In particular, the text itself is very carefully transcribed: for example, long and short vowel distinctions are consistently marked, as are glottalized and non-glottalized consonants. And it provides tokens of over 1000 nominal arguments, as distributed across a wide-range of grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic contexts: and so relative frequencies may be compared.
A key set of features for which this text was coded may be seen across the top row of Table 4 . In particular, each NP was coded for its grammatical relation, or case-role (broadly construed), as laid out in Section 2. A-role (qua relatively agentive argument of transitive predicate, as cross-referenced by an ergative affix); Srole (qua single argument of intransitive predicate, whether stative or non-stative, as cross-referenced by an absolutive affix); O-role (qua relatively non-agentive argument of a transitive predicate, as cross-referenced by an absolutive suffix); possessor of relational noun (whether or not the relational noun is itself the argument of a preposition); argument of preposition (when there is no relational noun); extra-role of clause (qua non-licensed argument of clause, often temporal Another key set of features may be seen across the top row of Table 5 . In particular, each NP was coded for whether or not it was involved in a possession construction (be it as possession or possessor), and for how it was involved: (1) all possessed NPs (and their possessors); (2) all simple possessed NPs (and their possessors), which will be referred to as SPNPs; (3) all inalienable possessions (and their possessors), which will be referred to as IPs. The second category consisted of all possessed NPs minus inalienable possessions, minus gerunds, and minus instances of the reflexive construction.
It should be emphasized that some nominal arguments may be analyzed by both sets of features (either those of Tables 4 or those of Table 5 ). For example, a single NP may be both an S-role and a simple possessed NP; and a single NP may be both an inalienable possession and a possessor of another NP. So the two largest token counts are not meant to be mutually exclusive.
As may be seen down the left-hand column of Table 4 and Table 5 , the text was also coded for another set of dimensions. Like the dimensions across the top row, these dimensions were chosen because they are locally salient (yet cross-linguistically applicable), and organized relative to clines or scales (which will prove useful for typological comparison). First, each nominal argument was coded for its information status: first-mention (never previously referred to in the text); resumptive mention (previously referred to in the text, but not in the current or immediately preceding clause); and thematic mention (last referred to in the text in the current or immediately preceding clause). 16 Some NPs could not fit into anyone of these three categories, being non-referential (such as vocatives, incorporated objects, negative pronouns, predicate nominals, parts of proper names, and so forth). Other NPs were coded as null: usually meaning that, while a potential nominal argument was formally licensed by a cross-referencing affix on some predicate, there was no actual argument (semantically speaking). This is the case, for example, when the argument in question was instantiated by a complement clause.
Second, each nominal argument was coded for its semantic role (or thematic relation), loosely speaking. This was the most difficult coding to do. A key concern, for nominal arguments which were licensed by verbal predicates, was the semantic role of the argument: actor (any doer of an activity or effector of a change in state); experiencer (for agents in two-place stative predicates: see, call, want, believe, etc.); theme (for patients in two-place stative predicates: see, call, want, believe, etc.); and undergoer for any argument that has a state or change of state predicated of it. Not all nominal arguments could be classified this way, and so it was also indicated what other kind of role an argument might have: possessor, adverbial (temporal and locative NPs not licensed by a preposition), predicate NP (he is my brother), predicative adposition (he is in the kitchen), others (unclassifiable relative to any of these distinctions), and null (again, meaning that while an NP was formally licensed by a predicate, via some cross-referencing affix, there was no formal or semantic instance of it -often because of complementation of some kind). In certain cases, values along this horizontal dimension correlated with values along the vertical dimension; but usually they were orthogonal enough as to be informative, especially in the case of core arguments. In certain contexts, I will make a distinction between actors (agent, experiencer) and undergoers (theme, patient), broadly construed.
Third, each nominal argument was coded for its relative rank in animacy. This property is really an inherent property of the referent, and was made relative to the analyst's standard. There were seven categories: deity (most of the key actors in the narrative, almost all of whom take human forms for much of the action); human (of which there were only two bona fide characters in the text); animal (ranging from dragon flies and turtles to snakes and bees); living (meaning an inanimate entity that is alive: trees, forests, plants, and so forth); organic (meaning a part of a whole which is living, animal, human, or deity: arms and legs, leafs and stems, fur and so forth); other (meaning inanimate in a narrow sense, as whatever concrete referents do not fit into the above categories: rocks, tools, houses, and so forth); and null (which again encompasses nominal arguments that have no referents at all, or cannot otherwise be classified). In certain contexts, I will make a distinction between animate (deity, human, animal) and inanimate (living, organic, other), in the strict sense: that which has (or does not have) sensation and movement.
Fourth, the formal class of nominal arguments was coded relative to a number of broad categories. It was marked as zero-realization if its only manifestation was a cross-referencing affix, and there was no full NP or pronoun present. It was marked as an inalienable possession if it belonged to class (6). Other salient categories included: deictics (and pronouns), gerunds, non-finite predicates, and Wh-words. It was marked as a common noun if it was an NP that did not belong to any of the foregoing categories. And finally, it was marked as N.A. if it could not otherwise be categorized.
Discourse Patterns Involving Inalienable Possessions as Core Arguments
How are inalienable possessions (IPs) distributed relative to other possessed noun phrases (PNPs), and how are possessed noun phrases distributed with respect to all noun phrases (NPs)? This question, then, is about discursive patterning: the distribution of NPs with respect to grammatical relations (A-role, S-role, O-role, etc.), information status (theme, resume, first), semantic role (actor, experiencer, theme, undergoer, etc.), animacy rank (deity, human, animal, living, organic, and inanimate), and form class (inalienable possession, deictic, gerund, etc.).
Before analyzing the distribution of PNPs, it is worthwhile characterizing the distribution of nominal arguments more generally. As may be seen across the top row of Table 4 ) Notice, then, that aside from extra-roles (which are relatively infrequent) and S-roles (which are relatively frequent, so far as they include the arguments of stative predicates, many of which function as auxiliaries), the other roles have very similar frequencies (around 120 tokens or so). Now we may turn to the distribution of the horizontal categories relative to the vertical categories (qua information status, thematic role, animacy rank, and form-class). To characterize a few key trends, as summarized in the first four rows of Table 6 , a number of well-known patterns should strike the reader's attention (cf. Dixon 1979 , DuBois 1987 , Greenberg 1966 . First, as one moves from A-role arguments, through S-role and O-role arguments, to Adpos-role arguments (which include both the possessors of relational nouns and the arguments of prepositions), the referents of these NPs go from old to new (or thematic mentions to first Here we can see how this trend carries over to adpositions (and possessions). Moreover, given the fact that possession is marked with ergative case (like A-role arguments), we may predict that possessor-role arguments will be +topic, and they will be co-referenced by NPs that are +topic +actor. In short, these patterns provide a useful baseline, relative to which the behavior of IPs and PNPs may be compared. We may begin by noting a few of the more simple patterns involving inalienable possessions. As may be seen from the first column of Table 4 , IPs are relatively frequent. 6% (57/1016) of all nominal arguments are IPs. If we set aside zero-forms (482 tokens), deictics (49 tokens), proper nouns (55 tokens), and relatively grammatical elements (such as gerunds, non-finite verbs, Wh-words, and such), then we find that out of the 358 remaining noun phrases in the text, 16% (57/358) are IPs. If we focus on possessed NPs, these number become even starker. As may be seen across the top row of Table 5 , there were 211 possessed NPs in the text. Of these, 57 were inalienable possessions (IPs), and 100 were simple possessed noun phrases (SPNPs). The remaining PNPs were gerunds (36 tokens) or reflexives (18 tokens). In other words, 27% (57/211) of all possessed NPs are IPs. And, if we remove gerunds and reflexives from possessed NPs, than 36% (57/157) of such NPs are IPs. In short, members of a finite closed-class category (IPs) are doing much of the work of a potentially infinite open-class category (possessed NPs, and NPs more generally).
As befits their name, IPs in this text were always possessed. 100% (57/57) were possessed compared to 21% (211/1016) of all nominal arguments being possessed. Indeed, some 60% of NPs are not even possessable, being zero forms (indexed by a cross-referencing affix on predicate), proper nouns, deictics, and so forth. However, if we focus on possessable NPs (consisting of IPs, gerunds, and common nouns), then 53% (211/395) of possessable NPs are possessed. In other words, IPs are indeed relatively inalienable: IPs are unmarkedly possessed and other NPs are unmarkedly non-possessed. Moreover, insofar as IPs are always possessed, they always license other NPs (as their cross-referenced possessor). So, another way to read the above fact is that, in comparison to other NPs, IPs frequently license other nominal arguments.
This fact should be coupled to a related fact that may be seen from the distribution of IPs across grammatical relations: inalienable possessions are often non-licensed. In particular, as may be seen from the bottom of Table 4 18 In other words, 39% (22/57) of IPs are not formally licensed in the strict sense: there is no predicate with a cross-referencing affix that licenses them. (Indeed, given that there are 235 NPs in S-role position, and only 141 NPs in preposition position, the relative number of IPs that occur in these positions is even more striking.) And 11% (22/202) of non-licensed NPs (arguments of prepositions, or extra NPs of clauses and NPs) are IPs. As will be seen, when adpositions are discussed, IPs are also the most frequent relational nouns and prepositions -and so this trend is essentially grammaticalized. In short, IPs tend to license other NPs and not be licensed as NPs. Loosely speaking, they are more like predicates than arguments, more like heads than dependents.
The top third of Table 6 shows how inalienable possessions (IPs), simple possessed noun phrases (SPNPs), and possessed noun phrases (PNPs) are distributed with respect to information status, thematic role, and animacy rank. It also shows how their distribution compares with that of other nominal arguments that are involved in various grammatical relations. First, as we move from A-role arguments to SPNPs, we move from thematic reference (old) to first reference (new). That is, possessed NPs usually have new referents on initial mention: they are treated as identifiable on initial mention (in the context of their possessors, which are usually already established topics). And while IPs are therefore at the bottom compared to nominal arguments in general, they are above other PNPs and SPNPs. Second, possessed NPs tend to be either undergoers (usually in O-role) or non-core arguments (usually in Adpos-role); though IPs are less frequently core-arguments than SPNPs. Third, IPs are more likely to be animate (33%) than any other kind of possession, and are even more animate than arguments in O-role and Adpos-role. Finally, possessed NPs are, of course, always NPs -and hence the not applicable (N.A.) entered in the last column. In some sense, though, they might be understood as 100% full NPs (versus zero NPs). Thus, possessions continue the trend whereby the further one gets away from A-role, the less likely a zero-form occurs -and, more generally, the less topical and more focal an argument is. In sum, compared to all nominal arguments, possessed NPs are at 'the bottom' of the four key clines (information status, theta role, animacy rank, and implicitness). And, compared to possessed NPs, IPs are at 'the top' of 'the bottom. ' Within the category of inalienable possessions, the two largest semantic subgroups -kinship relations and body parts -are also split with respect to discourse patterns. First, as may be seen by the middle third of Table 6 , body parts are more likely to be first mentions and kinship relations are more likely to be thematic mentions. Indeed, kinship relations have the highest resumptive mentions (52%) of all the tabulated categories. This is because this is a small set of referents (3-4 key characters) who are referred to again and again, so that kinship relations are used to relate the last topic (qua possessor) to the ensuing topic (qua possession). That is, kinships terms are used to establish topic-topic relations. Body parts are very different: it is rare to refer to the same body part twice; so the pool of referents is much larger; and so it is less likely for there to be resumptive mention.
Second, with respect to thematic role, kinship relations are more likely to be actors than body parts. But the real difference is that body parts are more likely to be core-arguments than kinship relations (which are more likely to be arguments of adpositions).
Finally, with respect to animacy, kinship relations are of course 100% animate -and so maximally contrasted with other possessions -whereas body parts are inanimate -in particular, organic (parts of personifiable wholes). Indeed, we may further break up the animacy ranking: 33% of IPs are animate (deity/human/ animal) and 4% of simple possessed NPs are animate; 2% of IPs are living and 1% of simple possessed NPs are living; 51% of IPs are organic and 17% of simple possessed NPs are organic; 14% of IPs are inanimate and 74% of simple possessed NPs are inanimate. In short, IPs are predominately animate (in particular, human-like deities), or parts of animate things. Whereas simple possessed IPs are predominately inanimate.
In short, while IPs are relatively similar to simple possessed NPs in regards to information status and semantic role, they are different in regards to animacy rank. Their inherent properties are different (qua semantic features of their referents); whereas their relational properties are similar (qua information status of their referents, or semantic relation to their predicates). This is not necessarily to be expected: in English we have many constructions like 'my hand hurts' (IP as experiencer) and 'my mother is picking me up' (IP as agent) and 'his elbow broke it' (IP as effector), and Q' eqchi' is no different: thus, one might have expected IPs (so far as they are kinship terms or body parts) to have relative agentive thematic roles (compared to other possessed NPs, which are more likely to be patients). However, as discussed in Kockelman (2003 Kockelman ( , 2007 , the ascription of mental states is done via a possessed-heart construction. For example, there are many constructions like, 'it fell into my heart' (I remembered it) and 'my heart did it' (I intended to do it). In such constructions, the possessed-heart is the controller of a coordinated predicate, and often has thematic roles like agent and experiencer.
Finally, we may turn to the possessors of possessed NPs. As may be seen by the bottom third of Table 6 , possessors tend to have a complementary distribution to possessions: they are at the high end of all the clines. Indeed, given that possession is marked with an ergative prefix, like A-role arguments, it is morphologically not surprising that their referents are +thematic and +animate. Relatively speaking, such possessions are more like O-role or Adpos-role arguments (first mention, inanimate, full NP, and undergoer), and their possessors are more like A-role or S-role arguments (old, animate, and zero). Possessors of IPs are very similar to possessors of SPNPs. As may be seen in Table 6 , their differences come out in animacy: IPs are more likely to have animals as possessors; and SPNPs are more likely to have inanimates and organics as possessors; but they have similar frequencies for human and deities. The biggest difference is that inalienable possessions very frequently have animals as their possessors (shells of turtles, hides of goats, features of birds, and so forth); and the possessors of SPNPs are more likely to be organic (parts of living entities). Notice, then, that it is not the case that the possessors of IPs are more likely to be persons (human or deity) than the possessors of SPNPs; indeed, they are more likely to be animals -all of which were personified in this text, as speaking and thinking creatures.
In the realm of possessors, body parts and kinship relations may also be distinguished. In particular, possessors of kinship relations are more likely to be thematic than possessors of body parts (89% versus 53%), and much less likely to be resumptive (6% versus 35%). Possessors of kinship relations were always zero NPs, whereas possessors of body parts were only zero about half the time. Finally, it is really in the realm of animacy rank that major distinctions may be seen. While possessors of kinship relations were all either human-like deities (17 tokens) or humans (2 tokens), possessors of body parts were much more likely to be animals or inanimate things altogether: deity (15 tokens), human (3), animal (10), living (1), organic (1), other (4). So the splitting between body parts and kinship relations is as pronounced in the domain of possessors as it is in the domain of possessions. Possessors, then, tend to be themes, actors, and animates -and so do the relational grounds of inalienable possessions: the person.
There is also a weak tendency for inalienable possessions to be possessors. Out of 211 possessed NPs, only 73 had overt possessors (in addition to the cross-referencing prefix). Of these overt possessors, 10% (7/73) were IPs (11/73 were proper nouns, and 51/73 were common nouns). Focusing on only simple possessed NPs (of which there were 100), only 35 had overt possessors. Of these overt possessors, 14% (5/35) were IPs (8/35 were proper nouns, and 21/35 were common nouns). Focusing on only IPs (of which there were 57), only 16 had overt possessors. Of these overt possessors, 6% (1/16) were IPs (3/16 were proper nouns, and 12/16 were common nouns). Given that more than half of IPs (as types) are kinship terms, this should make sense: the referents of kinships terms are both inalienable possessions and inalienable possessors, both parts of wholes and wholes with parts. Moreover, as revealed in a perusal of a Q' eqchi' dictionary (and see footnote 12), the most common constructions involving successively embedded possession constructions (e.g. possessing a possession which itself possesses a possession) turn on kinship terms (my uncle=my father's brother or 'his brother my father') and body parts (my finger=my hand's tip or 'its tip my hand'; my thumb=my hand's mother or 'its mother my hand'). This trend would be in keeping with the two trends already mentioned: IPs are both figures and grounds, both heads and dependents. It is their very reflexivity that defines them. Finally, it is worthwhile comparing the semantic distribution of IPs and simple possessed NPs. As may be seen in Table 7 , many SPNPs are similar to IPs -and are often found as IPs in other languages. For example, among the most frequent SPNPs are instruments (blowgun, bag, axe, cargo, mirror, bed, and so forth). In addition, there are companion species (dog, goat, deer), psychological states (fear, feeling, sleepiness), parts of (non-human) wholes (tip, foam, leaf, past, piece, juice, (7) leg a' 2 Always Possessed (7) chest maqab' 1 Always Possessed (7) arm telb' 1 Always Possessed (7), Relational Noun companion uchb' een 1 remains, corner), body parts (leg, chest, arm). There are four tokens belonging to marginal members of inalienable possessions (shadow, breath) and suppletive possessions (house, home). Most of the SPNPs had humans as their possessors, but not all. For example, there were words like 'corner (of a mirror)' , 'voice/sound (of animals)' , 'smell (of flowers)' , 'smoke (of something burned)' , 'feathers (of a bird)' , 'threads (of a tree)' , 'juice/pollen (of a flower)' , 'leaf (of a plant)' , and 'shadow (of house)' . As mentioned, certain words like ixej (back) had a relatively shifter-like tendency: depending on the animal in question, the referent was different: feathers (birds), fur (mammals), bark (trees), back (humans). Aside from the unmarked possessions (class 4), inalienable possessions are by far the most common class in terms of lexical types. And, indeed, inalienable possessions are the highest class in overall token number. Thus, while inalienable possessions are relatively similar to other possessed NPs (in comparison to all NPs) in terms of thematic role and grammatical relation, they are relatively different from other possessed NPs in terms of their frequency. (For comparison, following the discussion at the end of Section 3, Table 8 shows the distribution of derived NPs.) 
Discourse Patterns Involving Inalienable Possessions as Adpositions
As mentioned in Section 2, the NPs licensed by adpositions come in three varieties: possessors of relational nouns (e.g. x-b' aan li winq' 'because of the man'); possessors of relational nouns which are themselves arguments of prepositions (e.g. sa' x-yanq li tzuul 'between the mountains'); and bare arguments of prepositions (e.g. sa' li k'iche' 'in the forest'). Table 9 shows all instances of relational nouns in the text, whether or not they occur as the argument of preposition. Table 10 shows all instances of bare prepositions (with no accompanying relational noun). As may be seen, there are around 60 tokens of each kind of construction in the text. As shown in Table 9 , relational nouns may be the arguments of the prepositions chi or sa', or they may occur alone. And when they occur alone, they tend to mark highly frequent grammatical relations (dative, commitive, causative, etc.). Two even mark semantic arguments, or obliques, which are no longer licensed by affixes on predicates: -e (demoted patients of antipassive constructions); -b' aan (demoted agents of passive constructions). Both of these RNs may also occur with the complementizer naq and a full-clause, indicating 'in order to' and 'because of ' , respectively. The relational noun -maak shares a semantic space with -b' aan, but foregrounds moral culpability. The relational noun -uchb' een shares a semantic space with -ik'in, but foregrounds human companionship. The relational noun -ub' el is on the border -usually it occurs without a preposition; but in other texts it sometimes occurs with the preposition chi. The relational noun -e, from the inalienable possession ehej (mouth), may occur with and without a preposition, and is overall the most frequent relational noun (with 38 tokens). 19 When relational nouns are themselves arguments of the prepositions chi and sa', they tend to mark locative constructions -usually spatial relations, but also temporal ones. The preposition chi tends to occur with relational nouns that begin with a vowel (and typically have r-as their ergative prefix); the preposition sa' tends to occur with relational nouns that begin with a consonant (and typically have x-as their ergative prefix).
As may be seen, IPs and RNs are massively interdependent. In particular, of the 16 types of relational nouns, ten serve a dual function as a non-relational noun (mouth, sin, companion, face, stomach, back/fur/bark, substitute, first, waist/tail, name) . Seven of these non-relational nouns are inalienable possessions. And all of Finally, there are really only two frequent prepositions which RNs can be arguments of; and the most frequent of these is the inalienable possession sa' (which is now so grammaticalized that it can no longer be possessed). These are well-attested cross-linguistic patterns: inalienable possessions (and body parts more generally) often grammaticalize into relational nouns and/or prepositions (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2002) . This further underscores the fact that IPs function as predicates more than as arguments, and/or encode relations rather than denote referents. Table 10 shows all prepositions which have non-relational nouns as their arguments. As may be seen, there are really only three frequently used prepositions: sa' (58 tokens), chi (38 tokens), and jo' (15 tokens). As noted, the preposition sa' probably derives from the relational noun construction chi x-sa' 'inside of it' , which itself derives from the IP sa' ej 'stomach' . As a preposition, its meaning is relatively abstract, perhaps best glossed as 'in' or 'at' . Crucially, just as inalienable possessions are likely to be found among relational nouns, and relational nouns are themselves likely to be the arguments of prepositions, inalienable possessions and quasi-IPs are likely to be the arguments of prepositions -and hence perhaps on their way to grammaticalizing into relational nouns.
The key place to see this is with the most frequently occurring preposition sa'. Of its 58 tokens, 32 are possessed NPs. And of these possessed NPs, 13 are IPs, most of which are body parts: heart (3), hand (2), place (3), shell/back/feature (4), throat (1). Moreover, of the remaining possessed NPs, aside from one gerund (x-teb' al 'its opening'), the rest are semantically comparable to IPs: 'home' (ochoch, 3), 'road' (b' e, 1), 'bag' (champa, 3), 'tip' (u'uj, 1), 'thread' (noq' al, 1), 'mirror' (lem, 1), 'smoke' (sib' el, 1), 'corner' (xuk, 1), 'windpipe' (b' eeleb' al musiq', 1) , 'leaving' (elik, 1), 'shadow' (mu, 1), 'awakening' (waklajik, 1), 'passing' (numik, 1), 'slipperiness' (yolyolkil, 1). Most of these are construable as parts of wholes (corner, thread), or as effects of causes (smoke, shadow) -but the wholes are not necessarily people, and the parts are not necessarily organic. And some of these were even discussed in Section 2 and Section 3 as quasi-inalienable possessions (or as inherent possessions, or as suppletive possessions): home, shadow, windpipe, etc. 20 Hence, this is the perfect construction for examining what NPs might become IPs, and what IPs might become RNs. 21 It is the secret signature of inalienable possessions -perhaps the best predictor that an NP has an IP-like status.
Finally, it is worth saying something about how we might distinguish prepositions from relational nouns, and relational nouns from referential nouns. Recall Table 9 . The first distinction is easiest: prepositions do not have a cross-referencing affix; they cannot be possessed. The second distinction is more difficult, as there are really three kinds of relational nouns. First, there are those possessed nouns which only function as relational nouns (and never function as referential nouns): -yanq 'in between' , -k' atq 'next to ' , -ik'in 'with' , -b' aan 'because of ' , -ub' el 'beneath' . Second, there are those possessed nouns which function as both a relational noun and a referential noun: -e 'in order to' (cf. 'mouth'), -maak 'because of ' (cf. 'sin'), -uchb' een 'with' (cf. 'companion'). And then there are those possessed nouns that function as referential noun, and which can occur with a preposition (so they may also be relational nouns): -e 'mouth' (cf. 'at the side of '), -ix 'back' (cf. 'in back of '), -yii 'waist/middle' (cf. 'in the middle of '), -k' ab' a' 'name' (cf. 'in the name of '), -uq' 'hand' (cf. 'at the hand of '), -uq 'foot' (cf. 'at the foot of '), -ch' ool 'heart' (cf. 'at the center of '), etc. This, then, is where most IP-derived relational nouns occur. The crucial point is this: if a possessed noun may occur both as the argument of a preposition and as licensed by a predicate, then there is no obvious way to determine if it is a relational noun or a referential noun (in its usage with a preposition). For example, rather than gloss chi-r-ix (Prep-E(3s)-back) 'behind it' , it should be glossed as 'at its back. ' And rather than gloss sa' x-champa (Prep E(3s)-bag) as 'in its bag' , it should be glossed as 'bagged. ' That is, except perhaps by reference to frequency, it is difficult to decide where the class of relational nouns begins and where the class of possessed referential nouns following a preposition ends. Thus, most possessed NPs occuring as the argument of sa' -and hence the most IP-like NPs -are construable as relational nouns (though would not be listed as such in a grammar). This should make sense, given our discussion of the relation between inalienable possessions and prepositions in Section 5.
At best there is a cline of RN-like attributes that any such possessed NP could be judged by. First, there is relative frequency: as a relatively grammatical construction, types of relational nouns should be more frequent than types of nonrelational nouns. Second, does the NP have a non-referential, or relational, meaning: does it encode a spatial or temporal relation. That is, it is difficult to construe the NP in question as having a referent, or the referential value is metaphoric: the back of the house, the mouth of the cave, etc. Third, if the noun in question is an inalienable possession, then it is more likely to have a non-human possessor if it is a relational noun. Indeed, we may hypothesize that those relational nouns which used to be inalienable possessions are more likely to have human possessorsand thus, perhaps paradoxically, the ground of many prepositions is likely to be animate, discrete, figural, and so forth. Finally, whereas with possessive constructions the possession is the figure, the possessor is the ground (he hurt his back) and the relation is possession, with adpositional constructions 'the possession' is the relation between the figure and the ground, the 'possessor' is still the ground, and the figure is usually some other NP (the wheelbarrow is in back of the house). In this way, semantic features of the ground of the source (qua body part) become semantic features of the relation to the target. It would be interesting if the relative size of the class of inalienable possessions correlated with the relative size of the class of prepositions.
Conclusion: The Pragmatic Function of Inalienable Possessions
Let us briefly return to the end of Section 4. Just as the semantic features underlying kinship terms relate to each other via implicational universals, we may predict that so does the inalienability of various classes of kin. the degree to which we may predict the existence of a possession from knowing the nature of its possessor. 22 That is, if you know someone is a person, how certain can you be that he or she has a parent (versus has a child), has a father (versus has an uncle), or has a mother (versus has a mother-in-law). 23 Indeed, we might generalize this idea from kinship relations to all potential inalienable possessions (such as body parts, hair, clothing, names, tools, shadows, and so forth) under the rubric of emblemeticity (Kockelman 2007) . To wit: the more a possession is prototypically a necessary and sufficient criterion for personhood (all people possess it, and only people possess it), the more likely it is to be inalienable. 24 Though, to be sure, we may always invert the frame: the more inalienable possessions something has, the more like a person something is.
However, it is unlikely that the linguistic phenomenon of inalienability turns on logical inference in any explicit sense (qua necessary and sufficient conditions). Rather, it is best to recast the issue in terms of deictic inclusiveness, mutual knowledge, or identifiability: the degree to which a speaker can presume that an addressee can identity a figure (qua possession) given a ground (qua possessor). To clarify this point, it is worthwhile considering the indexical function of kinship terms, as one important kind of inalienable possession.
In Q' eqchi' , a word like ko'b' ej (daughter of woman) encodes a range of features: it indicates that the possession, or referent, is female; that the referent is in a first-generation, consanguineal, descending relation to the possessor; and that the possessor is female. That is, it encodes information about the figure (referent, possession), about the ground (possessor), and about the relation between the figure and the ground. As is well known from the work of Hanks (1991) , deictics also encode information about the figure, ground, and relation. However, whereas deictics establish the relation between a narrated event and a speech event (or E n / E s in Jakobson's system), kinship terms establish the relation between a possession and a possessor, where the possessor is (prototypically) a person. In other words, kinship terms are functionally equivalent to deictics, but rather than have the speech event (and its participants) as their indexical ground (or Sprachfeld, in Bühler's terms), they have a human possessor.
To be sure, the human possessor may always be encoded by a pronoun, which is itself a type of shifter, and so the relation established may be P n /(P n' /P s ). Compare the man's brother and my brother. In other words, the relation at issue is twofold: first, how the possession relates to the possessor (P n /P n' ); and second, how the possessor relates to the speaker (P n' /P s ). In short, we might say that kinship terms establish a relation between a narrated part (qua figure or possession) and a narrated whole (qua ground or possessor); and the narrated whole may itself be a participant in the narrated event which is established relative to a participant in the speech event. Indeed, just as verbs of speaking may shift the indexical grounds of deictics, such that the shifters in the reported speech are established relative to the reported event of speaking, so too may embedded kinship terms shift the referential grounds of inalienable possessions. Compare, for example, I will do it and John said, 'I will do it' with my wife versus my brother's wife.
These points may be generalized, thereby allowing us to compare inalienable possessions with prepositions and deictics. See Figure 3 . In particular, all these linguistic resources have a similar function, in that they involve a relation (R) between a relatively foregrounded entity (f) and a relatively backgrounded entity (g). Deictics relate a narrated entity to a speech event (E n /E s ). Prepositions relate a narrated entity to another narrated entity (E n /E n' ). And inalienable possessions like kinship terms relate a narrated entity to a narrated person (E n /P n ). 25 In the case of deictics, the backgrounded entity is the speech event, and hence is indexed (but not referred to). The foregrounded entity is minimally specified, usually turning on place (here), time (now), or identification (this) -though, it can be augmented: this boy, here in America, etc. Deictics, then, point very broadly: whatever is proximal. And the relation is often subject to a small variety of distinctions, often turning on a proximal/distal distinction: here/there, this/that, now/then. In short, for a deictic like now, R=proximal, f=time, and g=(time of) speech event.
In the case of prepositions, both the foregrounded entity and the backgrounded entity may be referred to, usually by an NP, and thus may be as finely specified as one wishes: the man is behind the red barn, etc. These slots may also be filled with deictic elements, and thus be specified relative to the speech event: he was to the left of that. R(F,G)=R(r(f,g),r(f,g)) or E n /E n =E n /E s //E n /E s . And the relation is encoded by a potentially large, but not open, set of prepositions (along with a copula construction): behind, in front of, on top of, etc. In short, for a construction like the man behind the tree, R=behind, f=the man, and g=the tree.
And, in the case of inalienable possessions, both the foregrounded entity and the backgrounded entity may be referred to (as with prepositions, and in contrast to deictics). However, unlike prepositions, the relation is much more constrained: essentially, there is a distinction between alienable possession and inalienable possession; and, within the category of inalienable possession, there is the difference between physical possession (governing body parts, often part-towhole) and social possession (governing social relations, often node-to-network). The referent is subject to a much larger set of distinctions than deictics (qua various types of body parts and types of kinship relations), but a much smaller set of distinctions than prepositions (which can have essentially any NP). And finally, in contrast to both prepositions and deictics, the ground is prototypically a person. Inalienable possession, then, is doing the work of identifiability (just as deictics and determiners do), but the figure and ground in question are not a narrated event and a speech event, but rather a narrated possession and a narrated possessor (which itself can be established relative to the speech event). That is, they are like prepositions and deictics in that they guide the addressee's identification of a referent by encoding that referent's relation to a particular ground; but they are different in that the ground is a narrated person. Broadly speaking, if we think about sense as the means by which we identify a referent, then open class concepts have a large degree of inherent sense (e.g. dog) and a small degree of relational sense, and deictics have a large degree of relational sense (e.g. proximal to speech event) but little inherent sense. Inalienable possessions have both inherent sense (e.g. which type of body part) and relational sense (e.g. whose body does this part belongs to). They locate a type of part relative to a type of whole with a large degree of precision, as opposed to a definite/indefinite contrast (a ball versus the ball) or a proximal/distal contrast (this ball versus that ball). While linguists, at least as far back as Bloomfield (1931) have treated possessed NPs as definite NPs, the ways in which they encode fine-grained distinctions of identifiability have not been considered. As was seen in Figure 1 , there are parts of a personable whole and personable nodes in a social network. Thus, if circle-qua-self is ground (g), any of the parts or people are frequently relevant and easily identifiable figures (f). What inalienable possessions grammaticalize, then, is not so much necessary and sufficient criteria of persons, but rather those parts (body parts, kinship relations, etc.) of a frequently invoked ground (person) which the speaker may presume the addressee may identify given the existence of the ground. Moreover, anything that can be construed as similar to such a ground (anything 'person-like'), may be used as a ground: at the back of the car, in the face of opposition, at the foot of a mountain, etc. That is, when we shift the ground from a person to something else, we construe that something else in personal terms. (See Brown (1994) and Levinson (1994) for a discussion of this fact in Tzeltal.)
Returning, then, to Figure 2 , the category is really this: (1) whatever any person may be strongly presumed to possess; (2) whatever such personal possessions are referred to frequently. They are marked entities in this way: on the one hand, we must take their existence completely for granted; on the other hand, we must frequently make reference to them. While their existence is symmetrically accessible to speaker and addressee (such that it may be assumed once a person has been invoked), their state is known only to the speaker and judged to be relevant to the addressee (such that it may asserted).
13.
As an example of a gerund in an interclausal relation, we have the verb eetz'unk 'to ridicule': jun ch'in-a-tz'ik sa' r-u'uj k'i-che' yoo-Ø-Ø r-e(e)tz'unk-il one small-SF-bird Prep E(3s)-top many-tree be-Pres-A(3s) E(3s)-ridicule-Nom a small bird in the top (fingers) of the forest is making fun of him
As an example of a genrun in an interclaual relaiton we have the verb muquk 'to hide': sa' a(a)nil x-Ø-hulak sa' r-ochoch x-muq-b'al r-ib' Prep run Inf-A(3s)-arrive Prep E(3s)-home E(3s)-hide-Nom E(3s)-Rflx running, he arrived at his house (in order to) hide himself 14. This means all the inalienable possessions I ever came across in my fieldwork -requiring that a noun be found in both its non-possessed form (with a suffix -b' ej) and its possessed form (without the suffix). It may be that other NPs will turn out to be inalienable possessions, but because I only saw them in their possessed form, or did not encounter them in my research, I cannot know for sure. However, given the fact that one characteristic of IPs is their relative frequency, I have some confidence that there are not too many more.
15.
All these terms are underived, or simple roots, with the following exceptions. The terms for grandparents are derived from those for parents: compare yuwa'b' ej 'father' and yuwa' chinb' ej 'grandfather' . The term for 'wife' (ixaqilb' ej) is derived from the term for 'woman' (ixq). The term for 'elder sister' (chaq'na'b' ej) is derived from the terms for 'mother' (na'b' ej) and 'equal/companion' (chaq'). It may be loosely translated as 'mother equivalent' . The term for aunt (ikanna'b' ej) is derived from the terms for uncle (ikanb' ej) and mother (na'b' ej). And a term for 'in-laws' (echalalb' ej) is derived from the term for 'son' (alalb' ej) and the bound form ech-, which marks relations. As may be seen, the majority of these terms take the suffix -b' ej when non-possessed. Terms for cousins (same generation collaterals), and nieces and nephews (first-order descending collaterals), are built, through recursion, from these basic terms. For example: 'my cousin' is ralal wikan or 'son of my uncle. ' And 'my niece' is xko' wanab' or 'daughter of my (elder) sister. ' Terms for step-kin are derived from terms for non-step-kin using the term 'second' (x-kab'). For example, x-kab' in-na' refers to 'my second mother. ' Ritual kinship relations (godparents) are referred to using either the terms for grandparents, or the Spanish loan words kompaal 'compadre' and komaal 'comadre' , which are not themselves inalienable possessions for many speakers.
16. In co-reference: for example, when the subject of the main verb agrees with the object (qua reflexive constructions), the second reference would be treated as thematic.
17.
The A-S-O diagonalization does not extend to adpositions because these encode a variety of semantic roles. As mentioned in Section 3, -e often licenses what would otherwise be an Orole argument in antipassive constructions; -b' aan often licenses what would otherwise be an A-role argument in passive constructions; -uchb' een often licenses a necessarily human-animate 'companion'; and locative constructions often have inanimate and/or old entities as their grounds, or reference points, and animate and/or new entities as their figures.
18.
To phrase this another way, 1/124 A-role arguments was an IP. 13/235 S-role arguments were IPs. 9/120 O-role arguments were IPs, 21/260 Adp-role arguments were IPs (5/119 as possessors of relational nouns, and 16/141 as arguments of prepositions). And 6/61 extra-role arguments were IPs.
